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tently or casually acquires inside information without realizing that it is inside
information.
As is true for any directive, the EEC itself will not prohibit insiders or tippees from
trading on the basis of inside information, but instead mandates the member states to
pass new (or harmonize existing) legislation to this end. The nature of the penalties is
to be left to the member states, but presumably they should impose both fines and jail
sentences as appropriate penalties. There is no reference to private civil actions for
damages, which would leave this as strictly optional, within the discretion of the mem-
ber states.
The draft directive on insider trading is quite interesting, as it marks a new stage in
the evolution of EEC securities law harmonization. It is currently in the process of
review by the European Parliament. The prognosis for ultimate passage of a modified
draft is quite favorable, although this will undoubtedly take another year or two.
That concludes my review of EEC securities law harmonization. It is clear that the
EEC has achieved an extraordinary level of harmonization within the last decade.
Further substantial attainments can be expected by 1992.
REMARKS BY CYNTHIA C. LICHTENSTEIN*
Linda Quinn and Roger Goebel spoke about harmonization in the field of securities
law, harmonization of rules for the listing of securities and for trading, essentially at
the point of issuance and in the primary markets. I'm going to address something
quite different, the next step in ensuring the stability of the global financial system:
convergence of capital adequacy requirements for multinational securities
intermediaries.
This topic concerns the issue of convergence in "safety and soundness" require-
ments imposed on the actors in the internationalized securities markets by various
countries. That may seem to you a very strange concept since the conventional wis-
dom is that, while consumer protection requirements can be harmonized, prudential
regulation cannot be. Conventions recently have been proved wrong. We have heard
a great deal in the last few years about international economic coordination-it is
sometimes called the convergence of national economic policy. The reasons for that
kind of convergence have to do with the basic requirements for underpinning the sta-
bility of the international monetary system and do not implicate regulation of private
actors in the system. But many of you also may know about a rather momentous
event that took place in December 1987. The central banks of the 12 major industrial-
ized nations-the Group of Ten plus Switzerland and Luxembourg-announced
agreement upon a framework of capital adequacy requirements for multinational
banks, the Basle Agreement.' The idea that it is necessary for the industrialized na-
tions to create a common minimum standard of capital adequacy for banking organi-
zations is starting not to sound so strange anymore.
We all are aware that the safety and soundness of banks is very important to the
stability of the international financial system. However, in the case of the Basle
Agreement, no one really expected that that agreement would be achieved. In 1982,
there was a panel at the ASIL Annual Meeting on the topic of "Cooperative Efforts in
International Banking Regulation," and one of the panelists, Paul L. Lee, who had
been Superintendent of Banks in New York, described efforts at international coordi-
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nation of prudential requirements as being rudimentary. 2 Yet now, only six years
later, there is an agreement that will be enacted by the national regulators, since it is
their own proposal, and that will force multinational banks to increase their capital
substantially. These harmonized requirements are also "risk-based", which is to say,
capital will be measured not only against loans or banking assets, but also against
exchange rate swaps, interest rate swaps, transactions called NIFs and RUFs,3 and
other new kinds of transactions with which multinational banks deal in the interna-
tional capital markets. Generally all off-balance-sheet transactions will be covered
and capital required to be held against them. Most remarkable, however, is that 12
different central banks, with 12 different ways of regulating the condition of the re-
spective banking institutions, have agreed upon a common framework of requirements
with national discretion only in the most minor details.
What, however, does all this have to do with securities firms? To us in the United
States, because of the separation of commercial banking and investment banking still
maintained in the Glass-Steagall Act, securities firms and banks are thought of sepa-
rately, and there is very little public recognition of the need for regulation of safety
and soundness for securities firms. We don't think that way. The public, particularly
after October 19, 1987, is peripherally aware that there are risks, and that the SEC has
net capital requirements for broker-dealers. But such requirements tend to be thought
of as a matter of investor protection. The rationale for the net capital rules seems to
be the hope that if a major securities firm were to fail, there would be sufficient liquid-
ity so as to ensure that the customers could get back their securities. The result of this
attitude is that the net capital rules do not seem to have been taken very seriously.
For example, in a recent SEC stock "parking" charge, the legal defense raised (among
others) was, in effect: "SEC, you really haven't enforced this before. Why are you
suddenly coming down on us now?"
The reason is, of course, October 19, 1987. With October 19, 1987 came the recog-
nition that the stability of the global financial system is threatened by the possibility of
major securities firms failing. In the week of October 19th there were a number of
events in the markets that bear closer examination. The central banks in all the mar-
kets that were collapsing on October 19 and 20 were required to provide massive
amounts of liquidity to the securities firms to prevent systematic failures. In New
York City, the 10 largest banks' access to the Federal Reserve Bank's discount win-
dow almost doubled their advances to broker-dealers that week. The Bank of Eng-
land, the British central bank, provided market support for a British Petroleum
privatization offering, claiming the markets and putting a floor on underwriting losses.
In Hong Kong, a credit package for the Market Guaranty Corporation included par-
ticipation by the two major entities that in effect perform the lender-of-last-resort
function in that financial center.
There is thus now, since October 19th, more general recognition of both the inter-
connectedness of the capital markets and of the necessity for concern with the sound-
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3 NIFs and RUFs are transactions in which a bank that is acting as a sales agent for a corporate issuer's
notes (NIF = Note Issuance Facility; RU = Revolving Underwriting Facility) promises the issuer that if
the notes do not sell as anticipated, the bank will make a loan to the issuer in the amount of the unplacecd
notes. The financial statements of the bank do not reflect this promise, since it is a contingent one, but the
bank is incurring a risk that it will be making a loan to a corporation at the very moment that the market
has decided it does not wish to hold the corporation's obligations. Hence a system of capital adequacy
requirements that takes risk into account will require capital to be held against the bank's contingent obliga.
tion under the Note Issuance Facility.
ness of the major actors in those markets, the major international securities firms.
Similarly, there is now much more general recognition that the international trading
in securities denominated in dollars is paid for through the Clearing House Interna-
tional Payments System (CHIPS) and that the multinational banks that participate in
that system are themselves or their affiliates are the major securities houses in coun-
tries other than the United States and Japan. It was the connection between the fail-
ure of Bank Herstat in 1974 and the CHIPS system that originally triggered the
formation of the Basle Supervisors' Committee by the central banks meeting at the
Bank for International Settlements in Basle. It now may be the recognition, in the
wake of October 1987, of the interconnectedness of the actors in the capital markets
and the international financial system that has triggered concern with the capital ade-
quacy of the major securities firms. The process of coordination by banking authori-
ties and securities administrators of capital adequacy requirements for multinational
securities firms will not be easy, but I will venture to predict that in the next four to six
years we shall see international agreement on capital adequacy requirements for secur-
ities firms in the international capital markets.
Four years ago, people would not have agreed with that prediction, but four years
ago no one would have believed that the Basle Agreement for capital standards for
multinational banks could be achieved. This is not to minimize the difficulties of har-
monization in this field. The Basle central bankers at least had a common culture of
supervision and control over their respective banking systems. The degree of market
regulation exercised by the SEC is probably unique among securities regulators, even
as the United Kingdom just now is thrashing out its new forms of supervision under
the Financial Services Act of 1986.
An agreement by the supervisory authorities concerned with international securities
firms will be even more complex than the working out by the banking supervisory
authorities of the Basle framework for capital adequacy. An official of the Bank of
England, Rodney Gilpin, gave a talk at an International Law Association Seminar on
the Internationalization of the Capital Markets held shortly after October 19th. Mr.
Gilpin described the difficulties in working out the concept of "lead regulator" in the
United Kingdom where many of the participants in the markets are both clearing
banks and major securities organizations.
The United Kingdom, unlike the United States and Japan, permits its major clear-
ing banks with access to the international payments system also to conduct, in the
same entity, or in affiliates of the bank, full-scale securities operations. Mr. Gilpin
pointed out the difficulties this makes for the supervisor concerned with soundness.
He noted that the Basle group has worked out capital adequacy requirements for
banks on the basis of credit risk. When we think conceptually, said Mr. Gilpin, about
what is necessary for capital adequacy for securities firms, then the concern is with
something called position risk. In short, the banking supervisors focus on credit risk;
the securities regulators, to the extent they do consider capital adequacy for securities
trading firms, focus on position risk. Thus, in the new world of concern with the
soundness of integrated financial entities doing both a banking and a securities busi-
ness, the regulators will have to learn how to work together. Moreover, the regulators
will have to think about what is position risk in markets that are behaving, as they
have since October, with extraordinary volatility. What level of capital is needed to
support an underwriter's or trader's business when suddenly the portfolio has fallen
500 points? It's unprecedented. So, at least in the United States and the United King-
dom, the supervisors are only beginning to think about it. Mr. Gilpin's talk then went
on to describe the U.K. efforts to work out which supervisor would be the lead regula-
tor for firms that are simultaneously in the international banking markets and the
international securities markets.
At the time Mr. Gilpin spoke, it had been agreed that the Bank of England would
be the lead regulator for organizations that combine in one corporate entity both the
banking business and the securities business, and to the extent that the banking busi-
ness exceeds the quantum of the securities business, the Bank of England will be the
supervisor both of its own capital adequacy requirements and also of the Security and
Investment Board's capital adequacy requirements. To the extent that there are orga-
nizations with separate affiliates doing separate businesses, then the proposal is to have
a committee of the supervisors meet to administer the separate capital adequacy re-
quirements. What has not been worked out fully is the capital adequacy requirements
that will be imposed by the Securities and Investment Board. As of this writing, those
requirements were much less clear than the capital adequacy requirements being im-
posed by the Bank of England, which will follow the rules of the Basle Agreement.
I have discussed the U.K. work on who will be the lead regulator because if one is
trying to work out a convergence of capital adequacy requirements for organizations
in the international capital markets, it will be necessary to take into account the need
for agreement between the banking supervisors and the securities regulators. Who is
going to do the job of setting the ultimate standard for capital adequacy as between
the securities regulators and the banking regulators? We will, of course, face here in
United States exactly the same problem because Glass-Steagall's "wall of separation"
between banking and the securities business in the United States will not remain. The
Senate passed, on March 30, 1988, the Proxmire bill which largely will dismantle
Glass-Steagall 4 if the House agrees to a similar bill. We do not know as of this writing
if the House will enact the Proxmire bill or similar legislation this session, but I believe
that sooner or later a restructuring of our financial markets regulation will occur and
probably will resemble the Proxmire bill.
When this big event does occur, it will be necessary for the banking regulators and
the securities regulators to start talking together about capital adequacy requirements
for the new combined organizations. The Proxmire bill recognizes this and provides
for it. The Proxmire bill contains a most interesting provision and is the reason why I
think we ultimately shall have international convergence of capital adequacy require-
ments for securities activities. Sec. 111 of the Proxmire bill, entitled "Study on Har-
monizing the Regulation of Banking and Securities Organizations", requires the SEC,
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and the banking regulators to
come together on harmonization of domestic requirements, working out who will be
the lead regulator and how capital adequacy and reporting requirements will be done
when the securities activities and the banking activities are combined, but the regula-
tors also are directed to include in the study what is being done in terms of efforts to
achieve international harmony and convergence of capital adequacy and financial con-
dition reporting standards for banks, securities firms and companies controlling banks
and securities firms. The study is also to comment on
the advisability of establishing a permanent international framework for develop-
ing and implementing global policies to better harmonize financial market regula-
tion, including capital adequacy standards; registration and reporting standards
for banks and securities firms (including associated activities in futures markets),
and companies controlling banks and securities firms; direct trading, clearing,
and funds transfer mechanisms; routine exchange of information to facilitate in-
4S. 1986, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1987), 134 Cong. Rec. S3437 (March 30, 1988).
ternational market surveillance of capital positions, trading activity, intercom-
pany transfers, and potential abusive practices; exchange of information to
facilitate the investigation of individual enforcement cases; dealing with interna-
tional market emergencies; and approval of new products and services;...
Section 111 (c) of the Proxmire bill specifically requires consultation of all the regu-
latory agencies, that is, the U.S. agencies with their international counterparts. The
Senate Report on the Proxmire bill states that the purpose of consultation is to have
the agencies "develop proposed revisions to harmonize the capital adequacy of bank-
ing and securities organizations using the recent international agreement among bank
regulators as a model. 5
These provisions in the Proxmire bill are, I think, a clear indication of the serious-
ness with which the regulatory harmonization process for this area is regarded. There
are other indications also. Very recently the securities regulators of the industrialized
nations have organized themselves into the International Organization of Securities
Commissions (IOSCO) modeled consciously along the lines of the Basle group of
banking supervisors. IOSCO's Technical Committee was set up in May 1987 and
meeting in July, created five separate working groups, one of which was to discuss
definitional and capital adequacy maintenance for multinational securities in-
termediaries, as well as exchange of financial data. 6 This group was scheduled to meet
in February 1988 in Paris. I have been unable to find any public report of that meet-
ing, but my guess would be that the group is concerned with the problems of working
out a common scheme. I think we will see in a few years an international agreement
on the amount of capital securities firms must have to support their dealing and un-
derwriting activities in these international markets.
COMMENTS BY GERHARD WEGEN*
It's hard to comment upon what has been said previously by the eminent members
of this panel. Yet I do want to venture some comments. First of all, I have been in
this country for three or four days meeting a couple of securities lawyers, and they all
said, "Oh, what a topic, Internationalization of Securities Markets." It is difficult to
pin down what the meaning of the term is. I just venture to say that, if we look at the
internationalization, we first should look at the national systems that underlie these
international markets. We have seen here today an outline of the EEC position, which
is very interesting because it is a highly regulated jurisdiction, and we have seen what
the EEC is proposing to do. It is a somewhat regulatory approach. And we have
heard the capital adequacy comments, and they are also very interesting.
I want you to understand what is perhaps a continental approach to the internation-
alization of securities markets, and I want to highlight some of the structural idiosyn-
crasies of Germany as an example of a continental jurisdiction that is totally different
from securities regulations in the United States. The way in which we discuss interna-
tionalization is very different. I think it is essential for practitioners to understand first
of all at least what the requirements are in another jurisdiction when they enter into it,
because they will have to cope with the domestic regulations. We have to cope with
the EEC rules, and I guess foreigners have to cope with what is present in Germany.
5S Rep. 305, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1987), to accompany S. 1886, at p. 73.
619 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 1303 (8/21/87).
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